This paper studies how capital market imperfections affect the welfare effects of forming a currency union. The analysis considers a bank-only world where intermediaries compete in Cournot fashion and monitoring and state verification are costly. The first part determines the credit market equilibrium and the optimal number of banks, prior to joining the union. The second part discusses the benefits from joining a currency union. A competition effect is identified and related to the added monitoring costs that banks may incur when operating outside their home country, through an argument akin to the BranderKrugman "reciprocal dumping" model of bilateral trade. Whether joining a union raises welfare of the home country is shown to depend on the relative strength of "investment creation" and "intermediation diversion" effects.
Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Mundell (1961) , the literature on optimum currency areas (OCAs) has proposed a variety of criteria for choosing if and when countries should elect to form or participate in a currency union.
1 These criteria include similarity of inflation rates, the degree of factor mobility, the openness and size of the economy, the scope of production diversification, the degree of price and wage flexibility, the extent of integration in goods markets, the correlation between economic shocks across countries, the degree of fiscal integration, and the political will to integrate. Bayoumi (1994) developed a formal OCA model that captures some of the key insights (expressed informally in some previous papers) regarding the role of openness, diversification, labor mobility, and the degree of correlation of economic shocks. Aizenman and Flood (1993) provided a more detailed discussion of the role of labor mobility as a criterion for an OCA.
2
Much of the early literature on OCAs took optimality criteria as given.
Recent research, however, has emphasized that some of these criteria may be endogenous, as a result of the very existence, and induced effects, of a currency union. For instance, it has been argued that similarity of inflation rates may be promoted by participating in a currency union, and that a high degree of convergence (or low dispersion) should not necessarily be viewed as a pre-condition for forming one. Hoffman and Remsperger (2005) have indeed found that, for the Euro area, the degree of persistence in inflation differentials fell significantly following the adoption of the common currency 1 Ishiyama (1975) provides an early review of the literature. Subsequent discussions include Masson and Taylor (1992) , Tavlas (1993) , Lafrance and St-Amant (1999) , De Grauwe (2000) , and Mongelli (2002) .
2 See also Calmfors (2001) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) for a further discussion of the role of labor market structure in the performance of monetary unions.
in 1999. Fiscal discipline may also be a consequence of joining a union-as suggested for instance by Fielding (2002) and as implied by the analysis in Sun (2003) -whereas the degree of labor mobility and wage-price flexibility may respond endogenously to the elimination of currency fluctuations.
Similarly, entry into a currency union may strengthen international trade linkages over time. Whether increased trade integration raises the benefits of joining the arrangement depends on whether it leads to greater diversification of production or instead to increased specialization, which would make countries more dissimilar. In theory, closer trade ties could result in national business cycles becoming more idiosyncratic, if they result in countries becoming more specialized in goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Countries would then become more sensitive to industry-specific shocks. However, if common shocks (domestic or external) tend to predominate, or if intra-industry trade accounts for most of the trade, then business cycles may indeed become more similar across countries experiencing greater trade integration.
3 This prediction appears to be supported by several recent empirical studies on the endogenous effects of currency unions on trade flows and business cycle synchronization. , Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2002) , and Barro and Tenreyro (2007) , for instance, found that if trading costs are large, countries that trade more with each other would benefit more from adopting a common currency. In addition, tighter international trade ties appear also affect the nature of national business cycles; countries with closer trade links appear to have more tightly correlated business cycles. This is in part a reflection of the adoption of a common monetary policy, but also the result of closer intra-union trade links. Frankel and Rose (1998, 2002) , Engel and Rose (2002) , and Glick and Rose (2002) , all found that closer trade links lead to more trade and more closely correlated business cycles across industrial countries. 4 The present paper follows a very different line of investigation than the recent literature on OCAs. It focuses on how capital market imperfections may affect the welfare gains of joining a currency union. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been very little analytical research on this issue; most of the literature surveys referred to earlier do not even mention it as a relevant criterion for assessing the net benefits that countries might derive from forming or participating in a union. 5 This paper is an attempt to fill this gap, using a simple stochastic model where financial intermediation services are provided only by banks. Our focus is on understanding how monitoring costs, and the degree of competition in banking, affect the welfare gains associated with (and thus the desirability of participating in) a currency union. A key step in doing so is a comparison between expected surpluses before and after joining the union.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the current literature on capital market imperfections and OCAs, and their potential importance for assessing the optimality of existing (and future) currency unions. Section III presents the model and describes 4 Some of these studies may overestimate the impact of currency unions on trade due to sample selection bias and nonlinearities (Persson (2001) ), as well as the endogeneity of the decision to join a union, which is influenced by geography and distance. The latter issue is addressed in Barro and Tenreyro (2007) ; they also find, however, that currency unions decrease comovements in output, possibly as a consequence of greater specialization. Moreover, Calderón, Chong and Stein (2007) found that the impact of trade integration on business cycle synchronization is much lower for developing countries than it is for industrial countries.
5 Exceptions are Giovannetti and Marimon (2000) and Alves (2008) . However, neither of these studies considers explicitly the existence and implications of credit market frictions, as we do here. the functioning of the financial sector prior to joining a union. The model upon which our analysis is based extends the framework developed in Agénor and Aizenman (1998 , 1999 , which itself dwells on the costly state verification approach pioneered by Townsend (1979) . However, in an important departure from these previous studies, in the present setting we also endogenize the number of financial intermediaries, under the assumption of Cournot competition. Section IV considers the case where the country under consideration joins a currency union, and analyzes the various channels through which financial factors may affect the welfare gains (calculated from the point of view of an individual member country) from joining the union.
These channels include changes in transactions costs, a diversification-risk premium effect, and enhanced bank competition. Regarding the latter, we draw an important analogy between the added monitoring costs that banks may incur when operating outside their home country, and transportation costs, in a manner similar to the "reciprocal dumping" model of Brander and Krugman (1983) . A graphical illustration of this effect is also provided.
Section VI summarizes the main results of the analysis and offers some concluding remarks.
Capital Market Imperfections and OCAs
As noted earlier, there has been limited research on the role of capital market imperfections in the design and functioning of OCAs. In one of the few analytical studies available, Ching and Devereux (2003) examine the argument, first proposed by Mundell (1973) , that a single currency area offers risksharing benefits when domestic capital markets are limited in their ability to provide consumption insurance. This argument goes against the "conven-tional" view, according to which a single currency area carries a welfare loss owing to the fact that the use of the nominal exchange rate to respond to country-specific shocks is precluded. They evaluate the costs and benefits of two monetary arrangements: a system of independent national currencies and a single currency area. They find that the presence of country-specific shocks may either reduce or enhance the benefits of a single currency area, depending on the importance of exchange rate adjustment relative to risksharing. Thus, in practice, either regime may dominate, although welfare differences between the two regimes may not be large.
However, there are a number of additional issues associated with the functioning of capital markets that have not been addressed. For instance, to what extent is an improvement in the efficiency of domestic financial intermediation necessary for a currency union to be welfare-improving? Are these welfare gains monotonic? Or is it only beyond a certain threshold of financial development that countries get to benefit from a currency union?
These issues are not mere analytical curiosities. Several observers have argued that the reason why the formation of the European Union (EU) in 1999 has not had yet a major (and lasting) impact on growth in member countries is because much remains to be done to integrate highly imperfect national financial systems (Hochreiter, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Winckler (2002) Alternatively, large differences in monitoring costs across countries may prevent the flow of capital within the union and constrain lenders' capacity to respond to greater borrowing needs (induced by improved prospects for greater trade integration), and therefore limit the growth benefits of the union.
7 For some recent studies focusing on the performance of existing currency unions in developing countries, and the potential for creating new ones in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia, see Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) , Masson and Pattillo (2005) , Saxena (2005) , Sturm and Siegfried (2005), Edwards (2006) , Neves, Stocco, and Da Silva, (2007) , Pattanaik (2007) , Karras (2007) , and Houssa (2008) . None of these studies, however, discusses in any detail the role of capital market imperfections in this context.
What the foregoing discussion suggests is that there is some evidence supporting the view that differences in financial intermediation costs (including both monitoring costs and contract enforcement costs) may explain the persistence of large price differentials in banking across countries in a currency
union. In what follows we present a model that captures these factors and examine their implication the benefits-or lack thereof-of joining a currency union.
The Pre-Union Case
We begin by considering the behavior of a small open economy prior to joining a union. The country considered has access to an integrated world capital market, but borrowing occurs (at a premium) in different currencies. Riskneutral banks provide intermediation services to entrepreneurs, who rely only on bank loans and demand credit to finance their investment projects. There is a large number of entrepreneurs, m, each of whom is a price taker, and n banks. We assume that m/n is large, implying that each bank can diversify away its exposure to idiosyncratic risk. The project's future return is random. It depends on productivity shocks, whose realized values are revealed to banks only at a cost. If an entrepreneur chooses to default on his loan repayment obligations, the bank seizes any collateral set as part of the loan contract, plus a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the project's realized value. Seizing involves two types of costs: first, verifying the outcome of the project is costly; second, enforcing repayment requires costly recourse to the legal system. Investment I i at the beginning of the period by a representative entre-preneur i results in output of a single good
where ε m is a macro shock, and δ i an idiosyncratic i.i.d. shock, uniformly distributed in the interval [−δ,δ], whereδ > 0. The good produced is traded, and its price is therefore fixed on world markets.
To simplify, we will assume only two possible states, with equal probability, for the macro shock:
whereε > 0.
The Demand for Loans
Investment is bank financed, at a contractual interest rate of r L . Default triggers a penalty, equal to αY i . Hence, assuming zero collateral for simplicity, the entrepreneur's debt service, S i , will follow the rule
The macro shock is public information. By contrast, the producer-specific shock is revealed to the bank only at a cost, proportional to the level of investment, cI i , where c ∈ (0, 1). To simplify, we assume parameter values that imply full repayment by all producers in the good state of the macro shock (ε =ε). In the bad macro state of nature, the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock leading to default, δ * i , is determined by
From (4), we can solve implicitly for δ * i :
Banks are risk neutral. All entrepreneurs are ex ante identical from the banks' point of view. Banks therefore offer an identical contractual interest rate r L , associated with banks' expected yield of r B , and finance the equilibrium investment level, denoted by I * .
As discussed in Aizenman (1998, 1999) , and as derived in the Appendix of Agénor, Aizenman, and Hoffmaister (2008) , the link between the contractual lending interest rate and the bank's expected yield on the contract is
where r B is the bank's expected yield on lending, determined later.
Given that entrepreneurs are risk neutral, applying (1), (3) and (5) yields the entrepreneur's expected profit, Π E , as
Substituting the bank's expected profits (as given in (6)) in this expression
which shows that, in equilibrium, the borrower in effect "pays" the cost of state verification.
From (7), the first-order condition determining optimal investment (which is the same across entrepreneurs) can be written as
Equivalently, this equation can be rewritten to show that optimal investment is determined by equating the marginal product of capital, a/2 √ I,
to the expected cost of borrowing funds, which is the sum of banks' gross expected yield, 1 + r B , plus the expected marginal cost of monitoring and enforcement:
where ψ is the sum of the probability of default, given by 0.5
the marginal impact of investment on that probability (see equation (5));
Equations (5), (6) and (8) characterize the equilibrium triplet (I * , r L , δ * ) corresponding to a given r B . It implies a downward-sloping demand for credit, I * , and an expected producer's surplus, Π * E , equal to
These results lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. An increase in the expected rate of return on loans, or a rise in monitoring costs, reduce both investment and the expected producer's surplus.
The Cost of Funds and the Risk Premium
The bank's expected cost of funds, or the expected yield on depositors' money needed to attract savers, is denoted by r 0 . Assuming risk-averse depositors, the cost of banks' funds is given by
where r f is the risk-free interest rate on world capital markets (assumed exogenous), τ > 0 a measure of transactions costs, and ρ ≥ 0 the risk premium, which compensates depositors for the fact that banks may default on their repayment obligations. In general, one would expect ρ to be endogenous.
For instance, in the absence of deposit insurance, recessions could be associated with a lower net yield on deposits, implying a higher risk premium (see Agénor and Aizenman (2006) ). In what follows, we will assume first that ρ is exogenous, and will discuss later the impact of financial integration and diversification on the risk premium.
Equilibrium Loan Supply
The n domestic banks in the economy differ only in the cost of running the bank (that is, the cost of operating the business). We assume that this "administration" cost is fixed and denote it by μ j , for j = 1, ...n. Banks are ordered according to their cost efficiency, μ j+1 > μ j .
With m entrepreneurs and n banks, the credit market equilibrium condition is given by
where L r is the supply of loans offered by the representative bank.
Banks compete in Cournot fashion. LetL −r denote the aggregate supply of all the other n − 1 banks, and let r B (L −r , L r ) denote the market-clearing interest rate determined by (13), for the case where bank r lends L r , whereas the remaining banks lendL −r .
Cournot competition implies that the representative bank determines its loan supply by solving the following problem
takingL −r as exogenously given. The quantity r B (L −r , L r ) is the expected bank's yield on loans, which is determined by the market-clearing condition
The resulting first-order condition from (14) is
In a symmetric equilibrium, with n banks, offering aggregate supply of L = nL r , the first-order condition reduces to
where η I/r B is the elasticity of the demand for loans with respect to r B ,
Rearranging equation (17) yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The (gross) expected yield on loans is equal to the (gross) cost of funds, times a mark-up that depends negatively on the number of banks and the elasticity of the demand for loans:
where nη I/r B /(nη I/r B − 1) > 1.
Equilibrium Number of Banks
The equilibrium number of banks, n * , is determined by the break-even condition of the marginal bank. That is, for j = n * (given our ordering assumption), expected net profits are zero if and only if (r B − r 0 )L r = μ n * . Using (18) yields
Combining (15), (18), and (19) yields the optimal administration cost as
In what follows we assume that η I/r B > 1/n, to ensure an equilibrium with positive interest rates and a positive number of banks. This condition is actually not very restrictive. Using (17), equation (20) can be written also as μ n * = m(1 + r B )I * /n 2 η I/r B , where dI * /dr B < 0 (see Proposition 1).
Applying the implicit function theorem, it then follows that
Hence, a higher borrowing rate will reduce the number of banks when the demand for borrowing is elastic. It is easy to confirm that in our model η I/r B → 2 when c → 0. The assumption of a relatively elastic demand for funds is thus a reasonable benchmark, which allows us to evaluate the impact of changes in the cost of financial intermediation.
Using (11) and (18), it follows that the equilibrium number of banks, n * , is given by
which yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3. An increase in the banks' cost of funds (resulting from either an increase in the risk-free rate or a rise in the risk premium), or an increase in monitoring costs, lower the equilibrium number of banks, n * , and increases the banks' lending rate, r B .
Banks' aggregate expected surplus is
Substituting (19) in (22) yields
The equilibrium is characterized in Figure 1 
Welfare
Our measure of welfare prior to joining the union, W , is the sum of the expected net income of domestic producers and domestic banks, as in Agénor and Aizenman (1999) , augmented by the consumers' surplus. Specifically, welfare prior to joining can be evaluated by the sum of the producers' expected surplus, obtained by aggregating Π * E in (11) across all producers, the domestic banks' aggregate expected surplus given in (23), and consumers' surplus, S H :
To account for an adverse impact of income volatility, consumers' surplus could for instance be defined as
where Q is income, E the expectations operator, V the variance operator, and θ > 0. For simplicity, however, we will assume that income is exogenous. 8 Thus, changes in aggregate welfare will depend only on changes in the producers' and the banks' expected surplus.
We turn now to an evaluation of the welfare impact of changes in the cost of monitoring, c. Recall that, ex ante, borrowers pay the cost of monitoring in the form of higher expected real cost of borrowing (see equation (7)). A higher c implies therefore a direct reduction in investment and a lower producers' surplus, thereby reducing the equilibrium number of banks (see (11) and (21)). In addition, because the exit of marginal banks raises the banks' equilibrium lending rate, r B , the higher cost of borrowing triggers a secondary round of adverse effects, by further reducing equilibrium investment, I * (see (11)). Thus, the net welfare effect is therefore
Hence, if financial intermediation costs fall upon joining a union, welfare would improve. However, as discussed next, the outcome is a lot more complex if domestic banks have a comparative advantage in providing financial intermediation services to domestic entrepreneurs at lower monitoring costs than foreign banks. 8 The analysis could easily be extended to account for endogenous (labor) income, by introducing labor in the production function (11) and assuming fixed wages (see, for instance, Agéor and Aizenman (1998, 1999) . However, this would complicate the analysis without adding much insight. 9 The marginal impact of banks' exit on Π * B is of a second-order magnitude, reflecting the break-even condition of the marginal bank; hence its surplus is zero.
Gains from Joining a Union
Consider two countries (home or domestic, denoted H, and foreign, denoted F ) operating initially with each other a floating exchange rate or a fixed exchange rate subject to occasional realignments. They then choose to form a currency union, which involves adopting the same currency and allowing full financial integration. In what follows, we discuss three channels through which this decision will affect each country individually: a transactions costs effect; a diversification-risk premium effect; and a bank competition effect.
In each case, we examine the impact on welfare, as defined in (24) with ∆S H = 0. In order to simplify notations and avoid working systematically with a two-country framework, we focus on the case where the countries considered are identical in all respects, except possibly for the monitoring costs associated with financial intermediation.
Reduction in Transactions Costs
The adoption of a single currency implies that transactions costs associated with conversion of foreign exchange, currency hedging, and the use of multiple currencies for trading purposes, are either reduced or disappear entirely for both countries. As noted by some observers, the reduction of these costs can be viewed as a proxy for the deadweight and efficiency losses in the foreign exchange market that are eliminated through the adoption of a single currency.
10
A reduction in transactions costs can be formally captured in the model by assuming, that upon joining the currency union, τ falls.
11 From (21), the 10 As noted by Grubel (2005, p. 512) , joining a union also saves resources required to run institutions whose purpose is to evaluate exchange rate risk and operate forward and futures markets. This resource gain is not directly accounted for here.
11 Assuming instead that τ drops to zero would lead to the same result as described next.
equilibrium number of banks goes up; there is therefore an indirect competition effect. From equation (18), and under the assumption η I/r B > 1/n (as indicated earlier), we have
implying that the cost of credit falls. This, in turn, stimulates private investment and increases the producers' expected surplus. Thus, a reduction in transactions costs improves welfare unambiguously.
Diversification-Risk Premium Effect
Suppose that, prior to forming the union, capital flows between the two countries are restricted to some degree by capital controls. Once the union is formed, all restrictions on capital movements are lifted. Thus, another channel through which the domestic country can benefit from forming a currency union is through a diversification or risk premium effect, which results from the fact that domestic banks (and consumers) are now able to diversify internationally their asset portfolios. In turn, the scope for greater diversification translates into a lower external risk premium.
Alternatively, suppose that the risk premium on domestic bonds depends positively on the volatility of inflation-possibly because all assets and liabilities are fixed in nominal terms. If the volatility of inflation drops following the formation of a successful currency union (because the risk associated with an unexpected devaluation disappears, for instance), the risk premium demanded by debt holders would fall. As in the case of the transactions cost effect described earlier, this would reduce the cost of credit, increasing thereby optimal investment, as well as the equilibrium number of banks. The net welfare effect is again be unambiguously positive.
12
To characterize the first effect, suppose that countries have the same degree of volatility of idiosyncratic shocks; that is, δ i has the same distribution across countries. In general, the distribution of δ i could affect ρ. However, given that the δ i 's are diversifiable domestically, its effect on ρ does not change as a result of joining a union; the issue is the relation between the two distributions of the macro shock in the two countries, ε Aizenman (2006)). In turn, the reduction in the risk premium lowers the cost of funds and increases producers' profits and banks' surplus. There is also an indirect competition effect, to the extent that the lower premium leads to an increase in the number of domestic banks. Although in (24) we do not account explicitly for the welfare of depositors, the net overall effect is thus an increase in domestic welfare.
12 Note that here we have focused only on the direct effect of the currency union, which is to reduce transaction costs within union members. There may also be an indirect effect (or stability gain), which may result from a reduction in the risk premium between the union as a whole and the rest of the world. 13 This assumption may not be warranted if increased trade among union members leads to greater syncrhonization of business cycles. However, as noted earlier, some studies do find that increased trade leads to less, rather than more, syncrhonization (Barro and Tenreyro (2007) 
Enhanced Competition
Now suppose that, upon forming the union, restrictions on entry of banks from the partner country into the domestic economy are lifted at the same time. There are two potential effects of increased bank competition associated with entry: a) a change in the (equilibrium) number of banks; and b) a reduction in (marginal) administration costs.
A useful way to understand the competition effect of a union is to consider the case where the home economy H forms a currency union with a foreign economy F that is in all respects identical-including monitoring and contract enforcement costs-with the formation of the union entailing the removal of all restrictions on the operation of foreign banks in each economy. In these circumstances, the formation of the union entails also a transformation from "relative" financial autarky to an integrated financial equilibrium.
14 The welfare consequences of financial integration can then be inferred by applying Brander and Krugman (1983) 's logic in their seminal paper on "reciprocal dumping," which studies the impact of trade integration of two symmetric economies, each characterized by imperfect Cournot competition.
Specifically, suppose that banks' monitoring costs, when operating in their own countries, H and F , are c H and c F , respectively. To simplify notation, we focus on the case where c H = c F = c. Domestic banks in each country have a cost advantage in their market relative to foreign banks. However, they are at a disadvantage when operating outside their own local market, which translates into an increase in monitoring and enforcement costs by the magnitude t. These costs may reflect the fact that, for instance, seizing a fraction α of the realized value of output-or, more generally, pledged collateral-in case of default may require recourse to a legal system that differs from the home country's. Hence, the cost of H (F ) banks operating in country F (H) is c + t. This "cost gap" leads to home bias in the provision of financial intermediation services, and is akin to the home bias in the consumption of goods due to transportation costs emphasized by Brander and Krugman (1983) .
Recalling (6), and using (9) and (10) A higher cost disadvantage in foreign markets, and a lower drop in home banks' cost of funds, both increase the likelihood of this outcome.
Our model can readily be extended to allow for asymmetric features, including cost advantages for some banks (that is, the possibility of lower monitoring costs, c). To illustrate, suppose that the only difference between the two economies is that c H > c F , which implies that home banks are less efficient in providing financial intermediation services than foreign banks. As before, we assume that offshore operations increase monitoring costs by t. To simplify the analysis, suppose that in prior to forming the union, the banks' expected gross yield in both economies is the same, 1 + r B . Similar to our discussion before Proposition 4, a foreign bank that considers operating in the home economy H will find that its expected return on the first unit lent to in the home market is
Similarly, a home bank attempting to operate in the foreign country F will find that its expected return on the first unit lent to in the foreign market is
Hence, the superior monitoring technology by country F banks relative to country H banks reduces the "cost gap" of foreign banks operating in the home country to t − (c H − c F ), while at the same time increasing the "cost gap" of country H banks operating abroad to t + (c H − c F ), relative to the case of equal monitoring costs. If
the cost disadvantage of home banks relative to foreign banks will be large enough to prevent them from operating in country F , whereas the cost advantage of country F banks relative to home banks will induce country F banks to provide offshore banking services in country H. This is the case where asymmetry in monitoring costs translates into "asymmetric dumping,"
where only country F banks operate in both markets.
We also need to consider now the relationship between t and c H − c While the cost saving is an obvious welfare gain, such a process may ultimately reduce competition if it leads to a large drop in the number of banks, with a relatively small number of "mega-banks" ultimately dominating the market.
Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the role of capital market imperfections in assessing the welfare effects of forming a currency union-a topic that has received surprisingly little attention among researchers. Following a brief review of the literature, we presented an analytical framework that we believe is a useful starting point for addressing some of the core issues involved. Our model considers a bank-only world where monitoring and state verification are costly and banks compete in Cournot fashion. The first part of the paper determined the credit market equilibrium and the optimal number of banks, prior to joining the union.
The second part identified various channels through which financial factors may affect the welfare gains that each country may derive from joining a currency union, characterized by the elimination of foreign exchange risk, the complete liberalization of capital movements, and the removal of restrictions on the operation of foreign banks in each economy. Thus, upon forming the union, foreign banks have access to the domestic capital market and may lend to domestic firms. These channels include changes in transactions costs, a diversification-risk premium effect, and enhanced bank competition. Regarding the latter, we drew an important parallel between the added monitoring costs that banks may incur when operating outside their home country and trade-related transportation costs, and derived a "reciprocal lending" equilibrium akin to the "reciprocal dumping" equilibrium derived by Brander and Krugman (1983) in their seminal model of trade under a Cournot duopoly.
In particular, our analysis showed that joining a currency union brings a welfare gain to a country only if the cost disadvantage that banks face when operating outside their own local market is sufficiently small.
The thrust of our analysis therefore is that, in the presence of credit market imperfections, there are a number of effects, operating through the financial system, that are associated with joining a currency union; the net impact of these different effects on aggregate welfare of each individual country is in general ambiguous. Whether the competition effect, in particular, generates a welfare gain depends on how strong the "investment creation" effect is relative to the "intermediation diversion" effect. By implication, incentives to participate in a currency union will differ across countries, depending on their degree of financial development. The benefits, from the perspective of a single country, of forming a currency union with another are not necessarily symmetric across countries. Those with more efficient financial systems have more to gain-as long as the costs that their banks must incur to access foreign markets are not excessive.
At a more practical level, our model suggests also that the deeper financial integration of European countries and the formation of the Euro area set in motion powerful competition effects due to reciprocal lending by banks that used to operate domestically, shielded from foreign competition. The competition effect is stronger the lower is the cost disadvantage of banks operating in foreign markets, and the weaker was competition in the domestic market prior to the union. For a low enough cost disadvantage of foreign banks, the formation of the union would be welfare improving. The competition effect tends to induce the exit of marginal banks. It may also lead to banking consolidation, in an attempt to exploit scale economies and to reduce the exposure to risk by means of geographical diversification. These results are in line with the empirical evaluation of Méon and Weill (2005) who, using data for all EU countries for the period 1960-95, found the existence of potential gains from inter-country pair mergers that would provide a better hedge against macroeconomic risk.
16
Our analysis can be extended in a number of directions. First, in the model, banks lend only to firms; a currency union brings therefore no direct welfare gain to consumers, whose income was taken to be exogenous. This is obviously not the case in practice; the formation of a union could bring direct benefits to consumers as well, most importantly in the form of enhanced opportunities for portfolio diversification and changes in the rate of return on saving.
Second, the formation of a currency union may lead to important dynamic effects on the financial system, such as a reduction of intermediation costs over time, and changes in the distribution of credit, to the extent that firms themselves relocate within the union. In particular, greater foreign bank penetration may lead to improvement in monitoring efficiency of domestic banks, which may translate into lower enforcement and verification costs. In turn, greater heterogeneity in these costs may affect the present-value benefits from joining the union in the first place. Alternatively, in a dynamic setting, greater financial integration between union members may lead to an increase in the symmetry of business cycles. In turn, greater synchronization of business cycles would reduce macroeconomic volatility, which would encourage savings and investment. 17 However, it is also possible, as argued by Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003) , that precisely because better financial integration enhances risk-sharing opportunities (or income insurance), it may make specialization in production more attractive, thereby rendering macroeconomic fluctuations less, rather than more, symmetric.
16 See Lensink and Maslennikova (2008) for an analysis of cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions in Europe during the period 1996-2004. 17 Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2002) , using corporate-level data from ten countries that adopted the euro, found that the introduction of the common currency lowered the cost of capital for firms inside the union relative to that of firms outside it.
Third, fiscal and monetary policy considerations could be added to the analysis. If joining a union leads to an enhanced commitment to low inflation, there may be a credibility gain that translates into a further reduction in the risk premium that member countries face on international capital markets. 18 However, this gain may be diluted if incentives for fiscal policy coordination are perceived to be weakened by the loss of monetary autonomy. Indeed, if the risk of default on government debt increases as a result, the drop in the risk premium associated with a reduction in transactions costs may be more than offset, making the welfare gains of joining a union ambiguous.
Finally, while our analysis focused essentially on the various channels through which forming a union may affect domestic welfare, and the role of intermediation costs in that context, it could be useful to analyze the implications of these costs for the formulation of a union-wide welfare function. A similar issue was examined elsewhere in the literature on currency unions (see Benigno (2004) and Lombardo (2006) ). Benigno (2004) , for instance, using a two-country model where labor is immobile and money is not neutral due to price rigidities, found that the union-wide welfare function (which is based on deadweight losses) should provide higher weight to the inflation rate in the country with a higher degree of nominal rigidity. In the present context, the question that could be addressed is whether the union-wide welfare function should provide higher weight to expected loss in the country with a higher degree of capital market imperfections.
18 Grubel (2005) for instance argued that in a curreny union, countries may enjoy better monetary policy. This arises partly because the large institutions to which they surrender their monetary sovereignty are more likely to be free from political influences, and partly because they have more financial and human resources to design and implement policy decisions.
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The Reciprocal Lending Equilibrium: Win-Win Outcome
Figure 2
The Reciprocal Lending Equilibrium: Lower Welfare
